CHAPTER 7
Step 5: Can You Do Any Other Type Of Work?
Step 5 determines what
other work, if any, a person can perform.
The claimant has the
burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence at Steps 1
through 4. At Step 5 the Burden of Proof shifts to the Commissioner of Social
Security to prove that there is other work that you can do despite your mental
and physical limitations.
If the ALJ is compelled
to carry your case to Step 5, there is a good chance you will win your case at
the ALJ level. You will not need to appeal to the Appeals Council, or to the
District Court.
The Social Security
Administration considers your age, education, work experience and
physical/mental condition to make this determination.
The ALJ can use
Medical-Vocational guidelines or “grids,” found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 2, at the fifth step of the disability determination after the
claimant has been found not to meet the requirements of a listed impairment,
but found nevertheless incapable of performing past relevant work.
The ALJ will determine what
your Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) is. That means, considering all of your
limitations what are you still capable of doing in the workplace? What is the
heaviest weight you can lift? How long can you stand without a break? How long
can you sit without a break? What level of manual dexterity are you capable of?
Was your past work
skilled or semi-skilled? Did you acquire skills that are transferrable to other
work at a lower exertion level?
And then there is the great unknown. It is
called PAIN.
Here is how the ALJ will determine if chronic
pain prevents a claimant from performing SGA:
1. The ALJ must conclude that chronic pain is severe enough to significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities needed to do most jobs. For example:
·
Walking, standing,
sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling
·
Seeing, hearing and
speaking
·
Understanding/carrying out and remembering
simple instructions
·
Responding appropriately
to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations
·
Dealing with changes in
a routine work setting
2. The SSA is
required to consider pain and the limitations imposed by pain in the
adjudication of a disability claim. However, before pain may be considered, a
medically determinable severe impairment must be established by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Once a medically
determinable severe impairment is established, then the established impairment
must reasonably be expected to produce the pain.
The SSA is required to evaluate the intensity, persistence and functionally limiting effects of the pain, i.e., how does the pain affect the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. Because symptoms, such as pain, sometime suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone, the ALJ is required to carefully consider the claimant’s statements about his/her pain with the rest of the relevant evidence in the case. A claimant’s statement about the intensity and persistence of pain or about the effect the pain has on his/her ability to work may not be disregarded if they do not substantiated by objective medical evidence.
The following factors will be considered by the SSA in the assessment of pain:
The claimant’s daily activities (ADL):
·
The location, duration,
frequency and intensity of the claimant’s pain (or other symptoms)
·
Factors that precipitate
and aggravate the symptoms
·
The type, dosage,
effectiveness and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has
taken to alleviate pain (or other symptoms)
·
Treatment, other than
medication, the claimant receives or has received for relief of pain (or other
symptoms)
·
Any measures, other than
treatment, the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain (or other symptoms)
(e.g., lying flat on his/her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour or
sleeping on a board)
·
Any other factors
concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain
(or other symptoms)
Pain, if present, is a symptom
that must be addressed in the adjudication of all disability claims.
3. To determine chronic pain disability, the SSA enlists medical-vocational rules, which vary according to age.
For example, if a person is:
Under age 50 and, as a result of the symptoms of chronic pain, unable to
perform what the SSA calls sedentary work, then the SSA will reach a
determination of disabled. Sedentary work requires the ability to lift a
maximum of 10 pounds at a time, sit six hours and occasionally walk and stand two
hours per eight-hour day.
Age 50 or older and, due to the chronic pain disability,
limited to performing sedentary work, but has no work-related skills that allow
him to do so, the SSA will reach a determination of disabled.
Age 55 or older and, due to the disability, limited to
performing light work, but has no work-related skills that allow him to do so,
the SSA will reach a determination of disabled.
Over age 60 and, due to the chronic pain disability, unable to perform any of
the jobs he performed in the last 15 years, the SSA will likely reach a
determination of disabled.
Any age and, because of chronic pain, has a psychological impairment that
prevents even simple, unskilled work, the SSA will reach a determination of
chronic pain disabled.
The following case demonstrates how an appellate
court will evaluate how the ALJ treated your evidence of PAIN.
KLAWINSKI v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
JOYCE L. KLAWINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 09-16033. Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Filed August 6, 2010.
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this case, Joyce L. Klawinski, the claimant, sought review in
the district court of the Commissioner's denial of her application for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3).[ 1 ] The review was conducted by a magistrate judge with the parties'
consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate judge affirmed the
Commissioner's decision, and Klawinski now appeals, presenting three arguments:
(1) substantial evidence does not support the findings of the administrative
law judge ("ALJ") that her past relevant work was sedentary in nature
and that she could perform her past relevant work; (2) the ALJ contravened
Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 83-20 by failing to obtain a medical
expert during the hearing to determine her disability onset date; and (3)
substantial evidence, in the form of medical evidence and factors such as her
daily activities and the side effects from her medications, does not support
the ALJ's adverse credibility finding which discounted her subjective pain
testimony.
Our review in this appeal is "demarcated by a deferential
reconsideration of the findings of fact and exacting examination of the
conclusions of law." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive if
"supported by substantial evidence," but the "[Commissioner's]
conclusions of law, including applicable review standards, are not presumed
valid." Id. (quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is "more
than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance," in that "it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Id. (alterations and citation omitted).
The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that she is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the first step, the
claimant must prove that she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity.
At the second step, she must prove that she has an impairment or combination of
impairments that is severe. If, at the third step, she proves that her
impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment,
she is automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or work
experience. If she cannot prevail at the third step, she must proceed to the
fourth step where she must prove that she is unable to perform her past
relevant work. If the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the
case proceeds to the fifth and final step of the evaluation process for a
determination of whether, in light of her residual functional capacity, age,
education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work. Id.
I.
Klawinski argues that the ALJ erred in misclassifying her past
secretarial work as sedentary when her specific duties in the family business
actually involved light level of exertion. She asserts that her past work was a
"composite job," consisting of duties of a secretary, office manager,
and clerk, because her past position required her to stand and walk for more
than four hours in an eight-hour workday, pick up parts and deliver them to job
sites, and work in the showroom. She contends that the ALJ erred in only
focusing on the less strenuous portion of her past relevant work and
subsequently in determining that she could still perform those duties. She also
contends that her composite position differs from the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles's ("DOT") definition of a "secretary,"
and, thus, the ALJ erred in finding that she could still work as a secretary as
such position is generally performed in the national economy.
As noted above, if the claimant has a severe impairment that does
not equal or meet the severity of a listed impairment, the case proceeds to the
fourth step of the sequential evaluation process and the claimant's RFC is
compared with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If it is found that the claimant can still
perform her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
To determine the occupational exertion requirements in the
national economy, jobs are classified as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and
very heavy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Sedentary work involves (1) lifting no more
than ten pounds at a time, (2) predominantly sitting, and (3) occasionally
standing and walking. Id. § 404.1567(a). Social Security Ruling 83-10
elaborates that "periods of standing or walking should generally total no
more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should generally
total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday." Kelley v. Apfel,
185 F.3d 1211, 1213, n.2 (11th Cir. 1999). Light work requires lifting no more
than 20 pounds and frequently carrying 10 pounds, and a "good deal of
walking or standing, or . . . sitting most of the time with some pushing and
pulling of arm or leg controls." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). To be considered
capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, a claimant must have
the ability to do substantially all of the listed activities under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b). Id.
The DOT classifies a "secretary" as sedentary in nature,
with the following duties:
Schedules appointments,
gives information to callers, takes dictation, and otherwise relieves officials
of clerical work and minor administrative and business detail: Reads and routes
incoming mail. Locates and attaches appropriate file to correspondence to be
answered by employer. Takes dictation in shorthand or by machine.
DOT Title 201.362-030. The DOT also defines the position of an
"office manager" as sedentary, which includes the following duties:
Coordinates activities
of clerical personnel in establishment or organization: Analyses and organizes
office operations and procedures, such as typing, bookkeeping, preparation of
payrolls, flow of correspondence, filing, requisition of supplies, and other
clerical services. Evaluates office production, revises procedures, or devises
new forms to improve efficiency of workflow. Establishes uniform correspondence
procedures and style practices. Formulates procedures for systematic retention,
protection, retrieval, transfer, and disposal of records. Plans office layouts
and initiates cost reduction programs. Reviews clerical and personnel records
to ensure completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. Prepares activities reports
for guidance of management, using computer. Prepares employee ratings and
conducts employee benefit and insurance programs, using computer. Coordinates
activities of various clerical departments or workers within department. May
prepare organizational budget and monthly financial reports. May hire, train,
and supervise clerical staff. May compile, store, and retrieve managerial data,
using computer.
DOT Title 169.167-034.
To support a finding that the claimant is able to return to her
past relevant work, the ALJ must (1) consider all the duties of that work and
(2) evaluate the claimant's ability to perform them in spite of her
impairments. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1574 n.3 (11th Cir.
1990). The burden is on the claimant to show that she can no longer perform her
past relevant work as she actually performed it, or as it is performed in the
national economy. Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir.
1986) (rejecting the claimant's assertion that he could not specifically
perform his past job, which required him to climb and descend stairs, because he
failed to show that the position in general required climbing and descending
stairs). Specifically, "[t]he regulations require that the claimant not be
able to perform his past kind of work, not that he merely be unable to
perform a specific job he held in the past." Id. at 1293 (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (1986)). Accordingly, where the claimant's
specific prior job might have involved functional demands and duties
significantly in excess of those generally required for such work by employers
in the national economy, the claimant must still demonstrate that, in addition
to being unable to perform the excessive functional demands actually required
by her former job, she cannot perform the functional demands and job duties of
the position as generally required by employers nationwide. SSR 82-61 (1982).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings
that (1) Klawinski's past relevant work involved only a sedentary level of
exertion, and (2) she failed to meet her burden to show that she could not
perform her past relevant work.
II.
Klawinski argues that the ALJ erred in failing to comply with SSR
83-20 in not calling a medical expert to the hearing to assess her RFC during
the relevant period, especially because the record did not contain any medical
determination of her RFC by the agency. She asserts that SSR 83-20 applies
because the ALJ was required to determine retroactively whether she was
disabled before the last insured date of December 31, 2004, as well as the
onset date of her disability. Noting that we have not addressed the issue, she
cites out-of-circuit law to address the issue of whether a medical advisor's
testimony is necessary where an ALJ must retroactively determine a claimant's
disability in the past and where the onset date is ambiguous. She submits that
SSR 83-20 particularly applies to a slowly progressive disorder such as her
knee condition.
Social Security Rulings are agency rulings published under the
Commissioner's authority and are binding on all components of the
Administration. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n.9, 110 S.Ct.
885, 891 n.9, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). Even though the rulings are not binding
on us, we should nonetheless accord the rulings great respect and deference, if
the underlying statute is unclear and the legislative history offers no
guidance. B. ex rel. B. v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. Unit
B Apr. 1981).
Social Security Ruling 83-20 states, in relevant part, that:
In addition to
determining that an individual is disabled, the decisionmaker must also
establish the onset date of disability. In many claims, the onset date is
critical; it may affect the period for which the individual can be paid and may
even be determinative of whether the individual is entitled to or eligible for
any benefits.
SSR 83-20. Further, SSR 83-20 defines the onset date of disability
as "the first day an individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the
regulations." There are two situations where the ruling suggests the need
for the ALJ to call a medical advisor during a hearing: (1) where it may be
possible, based on medical evidence, to "reasonably infer that the onset
of a disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to the date of the first
recorded medical examination"; and (2) in terms of a malignant neoplastic
disease, "[t]o establish onset of disability prior to the time a
malignancy is first demonstrated to be inoperable or beyond control by other
modes of therapy." Id.
We conclude that the ALJ did not contravene SSR 83-20 because the
ALJ ultimately found that Klawinski was not disabled, and SSR 83-20 only
required the ALJ to obtain a medical expert in certain instances to determine a
disability onset date after a finding of disability.
III.
Klawinski argues that the ALJ's refusal to credit her testimony
regarding pain and other symptoms she said she suffered is unsupported by
substantial evidence. Specifically, Klawinski asserts that the following items
of medical evidence in the record refute the ALJ's finding discounting her back
pain: (1) an MRI report of her lumbar spine on May 16, 2003, which showed
degenerative disc disease, disk bulging, and osteoarthritic changes, and (2) an
MRI report on April 11, 2005, which showed, among other things, lumbar
spondylosis, multilevel disc bulges, canal stenosis, facet arthropathy, and
foraminal narrowing. This showed that her back problems began before December
31, 2004, her last insured date. Next, responding to the ALJ's finding that she
was not debilitated to the point of being unable to perform daily activities,
Klawinski contends that she did not have to show an inability to "perform any
daily activities" to establish disability. She asserts, moreover, that the
ALJ erred in failing to consider the entire record, which indicates that (1)
she was in too much pain to perform housekeeping tasks such as doing laundry;
(2) she hired a housekeeper to do most of the cleaning; and (3) she was limited
in terms of activities such as cooking, shopping, and driving. She claims that
the ALJ wrongly discredited her pain testimony by citing her ability to perform
sporadic and limited household chores, as they do not preclude the presence of
debilitating pain. Finally, she submits that medical literature confirms that
the various pain medications she was taking could result in the side effects
she experienced, and, thus, the ALJ erred in rejecting her subjective
complaints of those side effects.
We apply a three-part pain standard when a claimant seeks to
establish disability through her own testimony regarding pain or other
subjective symptoms. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.
1991). The pain standard requires:
(1) evidence of an
underlying medical condition and either
(2) objective medical
evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that
condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a
severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
Id. The Commissioner "must consider a claimant's subjective
testimony of pain" if the claimant satisfies the three-part test. Foote
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995).
If the record shows that the claimant has a medically determinable
impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce her symptoms, such as
pain, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of the
symptoms so that he can determine how the symptoms limit the claimant's
capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In making this evaluation,
the ALJ considers all of the record, including the objective medical evidence,
the claimant's history, and statements by the claimant and her doctors. Id.
The ALJ also considers factors such as the claimant's daily activities, the
effectiveness and side effects of her medications, precipitating and
aggravating factors, and other treatments and measures that she has taken to
relieve the symptoms. Id. § 404.1529(c)(3). "If the ALJ decides
not to credit a claimant's testimony as to her pain, he must articulate
explicit and adequate reasons for doing so." Foote, 67 F.3d at
1561-62. "A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial
supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing
court." Id. at 1562. If the ALJ fails to articulate the reasons for
discrediting subjective testimony, the testimony is accepted as true. Wilson
v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's discounting of Klawinski's
subjective pain testimony as unsupported by objective medical evidence and
by factors such as her daily activities and the side effects of her medications.
In conclusion, we find no basis in Klawinski's arguments for
setting aside the district court's decision. It is, accordingly,
AFFIRMED.
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