Showing posts with label Social Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Social Security. Show all posts

Thursday, September 1, 2022

Disability Is Easy To Claim, But Hard To Prove.

 



When Albert Diaz, then 41, took his seat in the Social Security Administration’s hearing room in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, in October 2011, he had to lower himself onto his left buttock to avoid stabbing pain in his right leg. His dominant arm, the right one, was locked in a brace to keep it from curling in toward his body. He shook uncontrollably, a side effect of an electrical stimulation device implanted in his spinal cord to manage relentless pain. Three years earlier, Diaz had fallen backward three stories down an elevator shaft while working as a maintenance director in a luxury apartment building. Since the accident, his family of nine had relied largely on his wife’s teaching salary. His application for federal disability benefits was denied, and after waiting a year for a hearing, he’d come to appeal that decision before an administrative law judge (ALJ).

During the half-hour hearing, the judge asked him whether he attended church or belonged to any clubs, what TV shows he liked, and if he had any hobbies. They talked about his pain and how his family has to help him bathe, get dressed, and shave. Following his testimony, a vocational expert spent a few minutes testifying about what someone in Diaz’s condition could do for work. The conversation went like this: First, the judge asked the expert to imagine a hypothetical person of Diaz’s age, education, and work experience. Now, she said, imagine that this person can do light work, but the light work is limited. “There would be a bilateral lower extremity push/pull limitation,” she clarified, “occasional climbing, balancing and stooping but never on ladders, never kneeling, crouching or crawling. There would be a bilateral, overhead reach limitation, a need to avoid vibration and hazards.”

The judge then asked the vocational expert whether there were any jobs, anywhere in the economy, suited to such a person. Considering only the factors the judge had described, the expert answered that the person could be a “greeter/host,” and indicated that there were about two or three hundred such jobs in northeastern Pennsylvania. Or maybe a “price marker”—who attaches price labels to merchandise—1,100 to 1,200 jobs.

Two months later, the judge denied the claim, citing her belief that Diaz was able to do things like “perform occasional climbing, balancing, and stooping”—which is to say, she thought he could still work. In the nearly eight years it would take him to successfully appeal that denial, Diaz lost his house.

With a bite out of every paycheck, workers pay into the federal system of Social Security Disability Insurance just in case something happens that makes them unemployable. (A parallel program, Supplemental Security Income, or SSI, provides payments to low-income people with disabilities). Of the roughly two million disability claims the SSA receives each year, two-thirds are initially denied. Those who appeal get their claims reconsidered, and if they’re denied again, which most are, they go before an ALJ. It’s the claimant’s best chance for a reversal—last year, slightly more than half of such claims were approved.

A disability appeal hearing can seem surreal to an outsider. Unlike a court proceeding, it involves little storytelling or persuasion. And it’s only glancingly related to a claimant’s experience of impairment. “Disabled is a legal term, not really a medical term,” says Amy Vercillo, a vocational counselor and long-time SSA vocational expert. The government’s definition of a disability requiring compensation is agonizingly specific, focusing on the minutiae of how an impairment changes a person’s capacity to, say, reach forward, bend over, or lift 10 pounds. ALJs are tasked only with determining whether the claimant fits that definition. The objective fairness of the outcome depends entirely on how well the judge, vocational expert, and claimant’s representative—if they have one; it needn’t be a lawyer—can describe the claimant’s disability in bureaucratic doublespeak.

“The only unusual things about Albert’s case are that the injustice was fought and the right thing eventually happened. Other than that, absolute bullshit like this is routine.”

David Chermol, Diaz’s lawyer, introduced me to Diaz because his disability is so obvious, as was the system’s failure in his case. But Chermol says it’s common for the objective reality of a claim to get so chewed up by the hearing process that it becomes unrecognizable. “The only unusual things about Albert’s case are that the injustice was fought and the right thing eventually happened,” he says. “Other than that, absolute bullshit like this is routine.”

It’s not hard to see how the process can go off the rails. ALJs have to absorb hundreds of pages of medical records and testimony per claim, yet the SSA expects them to issue 500 to 700 decisions every year. The vocational experts, most of whom have day jobs in rehabilitation, not statistical analysis, have mere minutes to identify jobs and extrapolate from broad Department of Labor statistics and census data how many positions exist.

In identifying jobs, they must reference the grandiosely named Dictionary of Occupational Titles. First published by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1939 as a tool for job placement during the Great Depression, it describes in detail how nearly 13,000 jobs, from tire mold engraver to coyote hunter, are done. That granularity has made the DOT the central resource for SSA disability adjudication since the program’s inception in the 1950s, but it’s also made the book increasingly difficult to adapt to the changing economy. Most of its job descriptions haven’t been updated since 1977 (and none since 1991). In one entry last updated during the Carter Administration, the book describes an addresser as someone who uses a typewriter to print addresses on envelopes. Ten years ago, the SSA contracted with the Bureau of Labor Statistics to begin the process of replacing the DOT with a database that can be kept up to date, but it’s still not operational.

A competent vocational expert can make up for the DOT’s limitations using other data and their own experience to bridge the gaps between the book and reality (addressers now check rejected labels on Amazon packages). But Vercillo told me many are not trained for that. “You have to speak the language and address the issue of how disability is defined within that system,” she says. But at the paltry SSA pay rate of $107 per hearing, it’s hard to find competent experts willing to put in the time.

As a result, vocational expert testimony can be wildly inconsistent from case to case. In one hearing that was challenged in the Federal 9th Circuit in 2017, a vocational expert testified that there were 5,000 jobs tying tobacco leaves in California, a state not known for its tobacco farms.

“I don’t think it’s fair for a system to have one vocational expert telling me that there are 2,000 surveillance systems monitor jobs in the national economy and the next vocational expert in another hearing telling me, well, there really aren’t any surveillance system monitors, or there are 50,000,” says Judge David Hatfield,  who has held several positions in the SSA adjudication system, including as chief administrative law judge. He now consults for Chermol’s firm writing briefs and helping with federal appeals.

Some federal circuit court judges have attempted to impose a rule that would nullify vocational experts’ testimony unless they show their work, but in the 2019 case Biestek vs. Berryhill, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ruled that the expertise of vocational experts can be taken as a given, even if they don’t.

Compounding the problem, few claimant representatives know how to properly challenge expert testimony or the judge’s interpretation of it. (During Diaz’s 2011 hearing, his previous lawyer got confused by the judge’s hypothetical, mumbled an apology, and then asked the judge for help submitting his travel voucher.)

It’s difficult to say how often all of this results in a fair decision. An internal SSA review performed in 2015 found that ALJs correctly denied claims 98% of the time, but that was a “paper audit” that only took into account the information gathered by the ALJs, not whether they gathered all the information available.

“In particular for denied applicants, the determination process is really a disservice,” says Jack Smalligan, a senior policy fellow at the Urban Institute and former deputy associate director at the Office of Management and Budget, where he oversaw the SSA’s programs through four administrations. Smalligan cites evidence that claimants who spend years appealing have trouble reentering the workforce if they are ultimately denied. He thinks the SSA should shorten the wait by beefing up its pre-hearing reconsideration of claims—spending more time assessing applicants’ conditions and making the process more consistent across the country. “I would just as soon have as few people go before an ALJ as possible.”

By 2014 the financial strain had become too much for Diaz’s family, and he and his wife filed for bankruptcy. It’s not an uncommon outcome—from 2014 to 2019, 48,000 applicants waiting for an appeal decision had to do the same. The bank foreclosed on the Diazs’ home and they moved into an apartment with their three youngest children. “I had no choice,” he told me.

In the meantime, he appealed his disability denial in federal court, where a judge remanded his case to the same ALJ who’d rejected him three years earlier. Diaz’s new hearing took place one year later. The judge described her hypothetical person and asked for jobs. The vocational expert suggested information clerk, credit authorizer/checker, or surveillance video monitor. The hearing lasted exactly half an hour. And the result, which came nearly six months later, was no different. The judge denied him again.

Again Diaz appealed, waiting two years more while the system churned through its backlog. (A recent GAO report found that the appeals process can take dangerously long for the most vulnerable applicants—from 2008 to 2019, over 100,000 people died waiting for a decision). This time, a different federal judge remanded his case to a different ALJ, who questioned the same vocational expert more carefully this time. Chermol’s co-counselor Ashish Agrawal sussed out the hypothetical a bit more, clarifying that reaching, especially with the dominant arm, would be a problem. The vocational expert concluded that the jobs she’d listed in the previous hearing—including the video monitor job, which hasn’t been updated in the DOT since 1986 and these days requires keyboarding—might be hard for the hypothetical claimant to do.

The new ALJ approved him for benefits but misread his medical records as showing that his condition had improved, so the back pay he received only covered some of the time since his accident. He appealed yet again. A third federal judge, clearly frustrated with the handling of the claim, ordered the SSA to approve it in full one year later.

 Chermol’s clients, who he says include workers like Diaz, a 9/11 firefighter, and a veteran whose disability led to homelessness—represent a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of Americans who are denied disability benefits at the hearing level each year. (There were more than 125,000 in 2021.) Chermol is a former SSA insider—he spent 12 years defending the agency against challenges like Diaz’s. He believes in the SSA and that by and large its people are devoted to helping those who need it most. But he saw a lot of genuinely disabled people with either no or bad representation losing out on benefits, and eventually got “grossed out” enough that he decided to switch sides.

His specialty is not in humanizing the appeals process as much as gaming it. Instead of challenging what he calls the system’s “fictitious” framework, he focuses on establishing that the judge or vocational expert has made a technical mistake. “Even though the current system is a lie and a fantasy and based on nothing,” he says, “you can force your client to win if you know what you’re doing.”

“Even though the current system is a lie and a fantasy and based on nothing, you can force your client to win if you know what you’re doing.”

Reversing a denial of benefits can take years, even for an experienced lawyer. A 2014 study found that more than 60 percent of claimants denied at the hearing level were eventually awarded benefits. That’s partly because people’s disabilities often get worse over time, but also because the government is so hard to convince—that skepticism is predicated on assuring that taxpayer money goes where it’s deserved, with the expectation that well-intentioned experts, fluent in the language of bureaucracy, will make the decision. When that ideal breaks down, people like Diaz end up lost in an interminable nightmare of what looks an awful lot like bureaucratic evasion and nonsense.

Diaz only started getting his full monthly disability checks in 2020, 12 years after his accident. By then, he and his wife were divorced. He says the stress of his battles with the SSA, even more than the couple’s financial troubles, drove them apart. And the fight is still not over. The agency miscalculated his payments, gave him too much, and has now stopped his monthly checks until the difference is made up in early 2023. Diaz wouldn’t wish the disability program on anyone. “You think that when you become disabled, it’s there for you,” he told me. 

(Original Narrative appeared in MotherJones.)

“And it’s not. It’s all a game.” 






Judge L. Steverson U.S.ALJ (Ret) https://www.amazon.com/author/cgachall.blogspot.com

Monday, May 6, 2019

Social Security Lawyers Can Now Earn Higher Fees Because of Supreme Court Decision


Since 1956, the Social Security Administration(SSA) has made disability benefits available to people whose long-term medical conditions make completing their jobs impossible.
Lawyers who want to maximize their earning capacity don’t do Social Security law. They would be crazy to do Social Security law.
Recognizing that many Social Security disability claimants are in poor financial health, the federal government devised a payment scheme whereby lawyers receive a portion of their client's judgment if they win and nothing if they don't.
Since 1956, the Social Security Administration has made disability benefits available to people whose long-term medical conditions make completing their jobs impossible.
A U.S. Supreme Court ruling earlier this year created a uniform method for allocating fees across judicial jurisdictions, ensuring attorneys will have access to higher fees regardless of where they practice.
Considering that just 22% of workers receive disability benefits on the first try, the attorneys who help these workers often don't see payment for years, if ever.
Without attorneys, disability benefit applicants can get lost in the confusing maze of the claim process. They must first take their case before an administrative law judge(ALJ), and if the judge rejects the claim or makes a mistake — which attorneys say is fairly common — they then must go to federal court to dispute the decision.
In some Federal Circuits, judges interpreted separate limits the Social Security Act placed on fees for legal work before the SSA and the federal court as a single limit, capping the overall fees at an amount equivalent to 25% of the client's benefit award.
As an example, Lawyers in the Third Circuit, were not affected by the fee cap that plagued disability attorneys in the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh circuits before the recent Supreme Court decision.
In those circuits, judges interpreted separate limits the Social Security Act placed on fees for legal work before the SSA and the federal court as a single limit, capping the overall fees at an amount equivalent to 25% of the client's benefit award.
In other circuits, like the Third, judges allowed attorneys to collect an amount equivalent to 25% of the client's benefit award for court-level work. For agency-level work, attorneys could collect either $6,000 or an amount equivalent to 25% of the benefit award, whichever is less. Fees could come from both the benefit award and the federal government, which offers a pool of money to disability attorneys under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
The ruling's main impact could be to encourage Social Security attorneys who already practice in federal court to continue doing so, rather than abandon cases at the appeal stage because the money isn't good.
In the past, Social Security claimants' probability of successfully going up against the SSA varied depending on where they were. Now, claimants should have an easier time across the country.

Friday, January 11, 2019

No Cap On Attorneys' Fees For Lawyers Representing Social Security Claimants

Opinion analysis: Social Security cap on attorney’s fees applies separately to successful representation before a court

According to a unanimous opinion released today, Social Security law does not impose an aggregate cap of 25 percent on attorney’s fees for successful representation of a Social Security disability claimant before both the Social Security Administration and a court. Instead, a 25 percent cap applies separately to representation before the court. This is a win for attorney Richard Culbertson, who represented a disability claimant both before the Social Security Administration and in court. He may now collect separate attorney’s fees for his successful representation before the court.
The case turned on the meaning of “such representation” in 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which provides in relevant part:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [Title II of the Social Security Act] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.
The opinion, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, first applied a plain-meaning approach. The court quoted the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English for the definition of “such”: “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” and declared that “the only form of representation ‘already described’ in § 406(b) is ‘represent[ation] before the court by an attorney.’” Based on this statutory language, the court announced that “the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.”

Although the court began its analysis by quoting an earlier opinion: “We begi[n] with the language of the statute itself, and that is also where the inquiry should end, for the statute’s language is plain,” the court did not end the inquiry with the dictionary definition of “such.” Instead, it also considered other provisions of the statute and found that the structure of the statute and its other provisions were consistent with its interpretation of the statute.
The court noted that two different provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), address different stages of representation and calculate fees differently. Section 406(b) applies to court representation and imposes a flat 25 percent cap on fees for court representation. Section 406(a) applies to representation before the agency and provides two methods for determining fees for agency representation. One method, Section 406(a)(2), applies to fee agreements and caps fees at the lesser of 25 percent of past-due benefits or $6,000. The second method, Section 406(a)(1), applies when there is no fee agreement and authorizes the agency to set any fee, including a fee that exceeds 25 percent of past-due benefits, as long as the fee is “reasonable.”
The Supreme Court concluded that it would make little sense to apply the Section 406(b) court-stage cap to agency-stage Section 406(a) fees or the aggregate of Sections 406(a) and 406(b) fees. First, because many claimants never litigate in court, it would be incongruous to impose a 25 percent cap on agency fees based on a statutory provision regulating representation before a court. Second, applying the 406(b) cap to agency representation without a fee agreement would impose a limitation that Congress did not include in the relevant statutory provision. According to the court, “[i]f Congress had wanted these fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subsection (a), instead of providing for a ‘reasonable fee’ in that subsection [§ 406(a)(1)] and adding a 25% cap in § 406(b) without even referencing subsection (a).”
The court then turned to amicus Amy Weil’s argument that, when the statute is read as a whole, it is evident that Congress intended to place a cumulative 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees. The court acknowledged that Weil was correct in noting that the Social Security Administration only withholds a single pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits from which to pay fees for both agency and court representation. The court, however, noted that the single pool was the result of agency policy and the statute itself authorizes two pools of money for direct payment of fees. More importantly, according to the court, “the amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court.” Until 1968, the Social Security Act allowed fees for successful representation before the agency but did not provide for direct payment from past-due benefits. In addition, under current “§§ 406(a)(1) and (4), the agency can award a ‘reasonable fee’ that exceeds the 25% of past-due benefits it can withhold for direct payment.”
The outcome is not surprising in light of the clear text of the statute and the fact that neither party defended the judgment below. Although Weil “ably discharged her assigned responsibilities” as amicus, and “despite the force of [her] arguments,” the court ruled against her as it does in 75 percent of cases with court-appointed amici curiae.

Argument preview: Justices consider cap on attorney’s fees for successful representation of Social Security disability claimants (Corrected)


Attorney Richard Culbertson successfully represented several Social Security disability claimants both before the Social Security Administration and in federal court. Prior to his representation, he entered into fee agreements that provided that the clients would pay him attorney’s fees equal to 25 percent of past-due benefits for successful representation before the court as well as separate attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency. Following longstanding precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, the court below capped his attorney’s fees at 25 percent of past-due benefits for representation before both the Social Security Administration and the court.
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals as to whether the Social Security Act imposes an aggregate cap on attorney’s fees of 25 percent of past-due benefits for representation before both the court and the Social Security Administration, or instead the 25 percent cap applies separately to representation before the court.

The Social Security Act regulates the amount and manner in which an attorney may collect fees from a disability claimant for successful representation before the agency and the court. 42 USC § 406(a) governs attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency, while 42 USC § 406(b) governs attorney’s fees for successful representation before the court. The Equal Access to Justice Act also authorizes a court to order recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees” from the government in certain cases in which the claimant is successful and the government’s position was not “substantially justified.” If attorney’s fees are awarded under the EAJA and under Section 406(b), the attorney must refund the lesser fee to the claimant. The Social Security Administration withholds a single pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits from which to certify for payment any and all attorney’s fees awarded under Section 406(a) and/or 406(b).
Section 406(a) authorizes two avenues for recovery of attorney’s fees from a claimant for successful representation before the agency. Under Section 406(a)(1), an attorney may file a “fee petition” with the Social Security Administration. Alternatively, under a more recent and more commonly used, streamlined process, an attorney may seek approval of a “fee agreement” with a claimant under Section 406(a)(2). No cap is imposed under Section 406(a)(1). Section 406(a)(2) limits attorney’s fees to the lesser of 25 percent of past-due benefits or a specified dollar amount, currently set at $6,000.
For successful representation before a court, Section 406(b)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [Title II] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.
Section 406(b)(1)(A) further provides that “no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.”
Focusing on the “plain meaning” of Section 406(b), Culbertson argues that the term “such representation” in Section 406(b)(1)(A) clearly refers to the antecedent phrase “represented before the court,” and thus under the plain meaning of Section 406(b), the 25 percent cap applies to representation “before the court by an attorney” and does not include representation before the agency. Culbertson also argues that a separate cap on attorney’s fees for representation before the court is consistent with the structure of Section 406 as well as the purpose of the statute and its legislative history.
Almost 40 years ago, in the first circuit-court decision to address this issue, Dawson v. Finch, the 5th Circuit held that Section 406(b) imposes an aggregate cap on attorney’s fees for representation in the administrative proceedings as well as before the court. In reaching this result, the 5th Circuit looked to the legislative history of the provision in order to discern Congress’ intent. Specifically, the court focused on the fact that Congress added Section 406(b) to address two goals. First, Congress sought to encourage effective legal representation by “insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary.” Second, Congress sought to protect claimants against excessive attorneys’ fees, which in the past had reached one-third to one-half of claimants’ past-due benefits, by imposing the 25 percent cap on fees. In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit also looked to this legislative history to hold in Morris v. Social Security Administration that Section 406(b) imposes a cumulative 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees.
More recently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th and 10th Circuits have focused on the text of section 406(b) to hold that the 25 percent cap only applies to representation before a court. See Horenstein v. Secretary of Health and Human Services; Clark v. Astrue; and Wrenn v. Astrue, respectively.
The commissioner’s position on this issue has flipflopped over the years. Almost 40 years ago, the commissioner sided with the 5th Circuit in interpreting Section 406(b) to impose an aggregate cap and opposed the grant of certiorari in Dawson. Then about 15 years later, the commissioner sought and obtained 6th Circuit en banc review of the panel’s decision in Horenstein v. Secretary of Health and Human Services based on arguments that were logically inconsistent with an aggregate 25 percent cap. Almost 15 years after that, the commissioner argued in briefs before the 9th and 10th Circuits that an aggregate cap honors congressional intent and it would be inappropriate to permit attorneys to potentially collect up to 25 percent of a disability claimant’s past-due benefits at both the agency and court levels.
In this case, the acting commissioner initially supported the 11th Circuit’s rule imposing an aggregate cap. Then, after requesting four extensions to file a response, the acting commissioner filed a response siding with Culbertson and arguing that the text of Section 406(b) unambiguously applies the 25 percent cap only to attorney’s fees for representation before a court. The acting commissioner further argues that a 25 percent cap would be inconsistent with other provisions of Section 406(a) and that the absence of an aggregate cap does not mean that the agency and courts should approve fees that in the aggregate are equal to or greater than 50 percent of a claimant’s past-due benefits.
Because the acting commissioner agrees with Culbertson, the Supreme Court appointed Amy Levin Weil, an experienced 11th Circuit appellate litigator, to serve as amicus curiae in support of the 11th Circuit’s decision. Weil argues that the statute itself does not specifically state whether combined attorney’s fees may exceed 25 percent, and that the text of Section 406(a) and Section 406(b), read together, supports the aggregate rule. She also points to the legislative history on which the 4th and 5th Circuits relied in support of an aggregate 25 percent cap.  She contends that permitting attorney’s fees to exceed 25 percent in the aggregate could lead to attorneys suing their clients to collect fees out of their present or future Social Security benefits contrary to the Social Security Act’s purpose of ensuring beneficiaries a protected source of income. She also argues that rejecting the 25 percent aggregate rule would lead to absurd results, with fees of up to 75 percent of past-due benefits if a favorable district court opinion is appealed and the applicant is successful in the court of appeals. She contends that the aggregate cap allows a logical division of agency and court fees from the 25-percent-of-accrued-benefit pool in a manner that recognizes that a portion of the accrued benefits is attributable to the time that the case was pending before the agency while the other portion is attributable to the time the case was pending before the court.
The National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives filed an amicus brief in the case. The NOSSCR does not address the plain meaning of the statute. Instead, it contends that Section 406(b) cannot impose an aggregate 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees for representation before a court and the agency because Section 406(a)(1) does not impose a cap on fees before the agency. NOSSCR further argues that a court has no discretion to impose an aggregate cap. NOSSCR informs the court that in circuits without an aggregate cap, the prevailing market rate includes a cumulative cap either by contract or in practice.
Weil faces an uphill battle in convincing the Supreme Court to uphold the 11th Circuit’s decision. The plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation currently favored by the court supports Culbertson’s position. Moreover, amici curiae appointed by the Supreme Court typically only win about 25 percent of their cases.
If, however, Weil can convince the court to look beyond the text of the Section 406(b) in isolation, it may, like Chief Judge Geoffrey Crawford of the District of Vermont, find that “it would be strange indeed to believe that Congress would in 1965 denounce 50% contingency fees as excessive and enact a statute to stop them, and then, in 1968, pass a law with the effect of permitting 50% contingency fees.”
A previous version of this post inadvertently implied that NOSSCR advocated a particular method for EAJA offsets.


Posted Wed, October 31st, 2018 11:04 am


CULBERTSON vs BERRYHILL 

On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Culbertson v. Berryhill, No. 17-773, holding that the Social Security Act permits an attorney fee award greater than 25 percent of the claimant’s past-due benefits for representation before both the Social Security Administration and a reviewing federal court.
The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406 et seq., addresses attorney’s fees in two discrete phases: ‘“§406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; §406(b) controls fees for representation in court.’” (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U. S. 789, 794 (2002)). Section 406(a) gives the agency discretion to award a reasonable fee to an attorney who obtains a favorable agency determination in the absence of a fee arrangement with the claimant, but, if there is a fee arrangement, section 406(a) “caps fees at the lesser of 25 [percent] of past-due benefits or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000.” Section 406(b), titled “Fees for representation before court,” allows a court to award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 [percent] of the total of the past-due benefits” if “a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant.” Id. § 406(b)(1)(A).
Attorney Richard Culbertson represented a Social Security claimant before the Social Security Administration as well as before a federal district court. The agency denied the claimant’s benefits, and Culbertson sought review of that decision before the District Court. The District Court ruled in favor of the claimant, reversing the agency’s denial of benefits and remanding the case to the agency to determine the benefits due the claimant. On remand, the agency awarded the claimant past-due benefits and also awarded Culbertson fees under section 406(a) for representing the claimant before the agency. Culbertson subsequently moved the District Court for a separate fee award under section 406(b) based on his representation of the claimant there. “The court granted Culbertson’s request only in part because he did not subtract the amount he had already received under §406(a) for his agency-level representation.” The Eleventh Circuit affirmed based on its precedent at the time which dictated that ‘“the 25 [percent] limit from §406(b) applies to total fees awarded under both §406(a) and (b), precluding the aggregate allowance of attorney’s fees greater than [25] percent of the past due benefits received by the claimant.’” (quoting Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security, 861 F. 3d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted)).
The Supreme Court began and ended its inquiry with the language of the statute because ‘“the statute’s language is plain.’” The Court observed that § 406(b) specifically addresses representation in court and allows a court to award ‘“a reasonable fee for such representation.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)). The Court held that the phrase “such representation” in section 406(b) demonstrated that section 406(b)’s “25 [percent] cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.” The Court explained that “the adjective ‘such’ means ‘[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,’” (quoting H. Fowler & F. Fowler, Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1289 (5th ed. 1964)), and that “the only form of representation ‘already described’ in §406(b) is ‘represent[ation] before the court by an attorney.’”
The Court went on to explain that the structure of the statute confirmed the Court’s interpretation. First, “subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representation,” and it makes sense “that the statute contemplates separate fees for each stage of representation.” And, second, the subsections calculate the attorney’s fees differently. Were the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation correct, section 406(b)’s calculation of fees would limit section 406(a)’s calculation, which “would make little sense” given that “[m]any claimants will never litigate in court.”
The Court rejected the argument advanced by amicus curiae that, reading the statute as a whole, Congress intended a cumulative 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency and the court. Acknowledging the Commissioner’s current policy to withhold only 25 percent of past-due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees, the Court nonetheless noted that the statute provides “two pools of money for direct payment of fees” and further that “[a]ny shortage of withheld benefits for direct payment of fees is thus due to agency policy.” The Court also observed that the amount of past-due benefits withheld for direct payment did not limit the amount of fees that could be charged, observing that the statute historically did not have a direct payment mechanism.
Justice Thomas delivered the decision for a unanimous Court.
 

Monday, June 11, 2018

Crime Does Not Pay For Two Social Security Judges and A Lawyer

Fugitive lawyer pleads guilty for escape, fraud

Attorney Eric Christopher Conn, 58, of Pikeville pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Danny C. Reeves of the Eastern District of Kentucky to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, one count of conspiracy to escape and one count of conspiracy to retaliate against an informant. Sentencing is set for September 7, 2018.
http://cgacriticalthinkers.blogspot.com/2017/12/when-judge-breaks-law-when-judge-goes.html
According to the plea, from October 2004 to December 2017, Conn participated in a scheme with former SSA administrative law judge David Black Daugherty, multiple doctors, including clinical psychologist Alfred Bradley Adkins, and others to submit thousands of falsified medical documents to the SSA to fraudulently obtain disability benefits totaling more than $550 million for thousands of individuals.
According to the plea, of a former SSA employee discovering and providing information about the scheme to federal agents, Conn and former SSA administrative law judge Charlie Paul Andrus conspired and acted to have the former SSA employee terminated in an effort to discredit the employee.
Finally, Conn admitted that after pleading guilty in March 2017, and prior to being sentenced on June 2, 2017, he fled the country with the help of Curtis Lee Wyatt by severing the electronic monitoring device from his ankle and fleeing across the Mexican border. 
Conn was originally charged in April 2016, along with Daugherty and Adkins, in an 18-count indictment with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and other related offenses in connection with the disability fraud scheme.
Conn subsequently pleaded guilty on March 24, 2017, to a two-count information charging him with theft of government money and paying illegal gratuities, and he was sentenced in absentia on July 14, 2017 to 12 years in prison on those charges.
After his flight from the United States, Conn was charged, along with Wyatt, in September 2017, in a seven-count indictment with conspiracy to escape, escape and other related offenses.
On Dec. 5, 2017, Conn was returned to the United States from Honduras after being apprehended by Honduran authorities.
Conn’s plea today resolves the outstanding charges against him.
In addition to the 12 years in prison Conn is currently serving, he now faces an additional 15 years in prison. As part of the plea agreement, Conn agreed to recommend to the Court at sentencing that the Court sentence him to the maximum possible sentence, a 15-year sentence, and run that sentence consecutive to the 12-year sentence previously imposed, for a total of 27 years in prison.
Andrus pleaded guilty in June 2016 to a one-count information charging him with conspiracy to retaliate against an informant, and was sentenced Aug. 7, 2017 to six months in prison.
Daugherty pleaded guilty in May 2017 to a two-count information charging him with receiving illegal gratuities, and was sentenced on Aug. 25, 2017, to four years in prison.
Adkins was found guilty following a six-day trial in June 2017 of one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, one count of wire fraud and one count of making false statements, and was sentenced on Sept. 22, 2017, to 25 years in prison. Wyatt pleaded guilty in March 2018, and is scheduled to be sentenced on June 29.
(June 6, 2018)

Wednesday, January 24, 2018

If You Cannot Trust The Clerk At The Social Security Office To Help With Your Case, Who Can You Trust?


Feds say Social Security rep scammed thousands from clients. Then he shot a selfie.

 

Tuesday, June 13, 2017

SSA Plans To Scrap Treating Physician's Rule

New Rule May Worsen Backlog For Social Security Disability Claimants



By the time Stephenie Hashmi of Lenexa, Kansas, was in her mid-20s, she had achieved a lifelong dream: She was the charge nurse at one of Kansas City’s largest intensive care units. But even as she cared for patients, she realized something was off with her own health.
“I remember just feeling tired and feeling sick and hurting, and not knowing why my joints and body was hurting,” Hashmi says.
Hashmi was diagnosed with systemic lupus, a disease in which the body’s immune system attacks its own tissues and organs.
She’s had surgeries and treatments, but now, at age 41, Hashmi is often bedridden. She finally had to leave her job about 6 years ago, but when she applied for Social Security disability benefits, she was denied.

“I just started bawling. Because I felt like, if they looked at my records or read these notes, surely they would understand my situation,” Hashmi says.
Lisa Ekman, director of government affairs for the National Organization of Social Security Claimants Representatives, says Hashmi’s struggle with the application process is not unusual.
“It is not easy to get disability benefits. It’s a very complicated and difficult process,” Ekman says.
Right now, just about 45 percent of people who apply for Social Security disability benefits are accepted, and getting a hearing takes an average of nearly 600 days.
The Kansas City office’s average hearing time is closer to 500 days, but its approval rate is slight lower at 40 percent.
The Backlog started snowballing about 10 years ago, around the time Jason Fichtner became acting Deputy Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA).
He says that during the Great Recession, a lot of people who had disabilities applied but weren’t necessarily unable to work.
“But they’re on the margin,” Fichtner says. “They can work, but when the recession happens, those are the first people who tend to lose their jobs, and then they apply for disability insurance.”
There are now more than a million people across the country waiting for hearings. Adding to the strain, the Social Security Administration’s core operating budget has shrunk by 10 percent since 2010.
This spring, the SSA introduced changes to fight fraud and streamline the application process, including a new fraud-fighting measure that removes the special consideration given to a person’s long-time doctor.  (This is known as The Treating Physician's Rule)
Lisa Ekman says this is a mistake.
“Those changes would now put the evidence from a treating physician on the same weight as evidence from a medical consultant employed to do a one-time brief examination or a medical consultant they had do a review of the paper file and may have never examined the individual,” Ekman says.
She says this could lead to more denials for disabled people with complex conditions like lupus, multiple sclerosis or schizophrenia. These illnesses can affect patients in very different ways and may be hard for an outside doctor or nurse to assess.
She says more denials will lead to more appeals, which will only increase the backlog.
She is correct. The Treating Physician's Opinion is controlling.
https://judgelondonsteverson.me/2016/06/24/the-treating-physician-rule-is-controlling/
But former administrator Fichtner, now a senior research fellow at George Mason University’s Mercatus Center, says the SSA is obligated to weed out any fraud it can, including the admittedly rare cases of treating physicians tipping the scale in favor of their patients.
He says the SSA can still prioritize applicants.
“For patients that are really in dire condition and really have major disabilities, I don’t think they have to worry about this rule change,” Fichtner says.
He acknowledges, however, that the backlog needs attention and says the agency has safeguards to monitor whether the rule is working.
Back in her kitchen in Lenexa, Stephenie Hashmi’s husband Shawn prepares a family dinner she won’t be able to eat because she’s having problems with her esophagus.
Stephenie puts on a brave smile, but the progression of her illness and the ordeal with Social Security have made her increasingly pessimistic.
After several rejections, she’s now on her final appeal. Her hearing is scheduled for November – of   2018.

Tuesday, June 28, 2016

SSA ALJ's Decisions Have Persistent, Serious and Ignored Deficiencies, Appeals Court Says

 

7th Circuit judge reverses benefits denial,  and chastises Social Security process.




Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner had harsh words for the Social Security Administration (SSA) Office of Disability Adjudication And Review (ODAR) regarding Vocational Expert (VE) Testimony: clean up your act.

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Anne Hill’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB)  and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), finding the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) credibility analysis was flawed.
Ms. Hill, 56, worked for more than 13 years at a steel factory where she had to carry steel sheets weighing up to 100 pounds. The manual labor took a toll on her body and she applied for disability benefits in 2011. Her physical issues included total hip replacement, knee pain, recommended total shoulder replacement, and severe physical limitations in the use of her left side.

Her daily activities included babysitting, but she was unable to lift the child, did chores and went to church, but was unable to sit or stand for long periods of time.

The VE in her case testified that she could work at jobs classified as light and unskilled, such as dealer account investigator or a counter clerk. The VE, using his own experience to opine on how Ms Hill’s issues with her left side would impact her ability to work, testified she could still perform sedentary jobs such as a registration clerk.
https://www.amazon.com/socialNsecurity-Confessions-Social-Security-Judge/dp/1449569757?ie=UTF8&ref_=asap_bc
Using the five-step analysis for assessing disability, the ALJ concluded Hill was not disabled. The ALJ noted that Hill was not taking narcotic pain relievers, but Hill had testified that was because of her past alcohol addiction.  The judge reasoned Hill exaggerated her back pain because she hadn’t been diagnosed with certain conditions, but that conclusion is not supported by any medical evidence in the record.

“We are not confident that the ALJ would have reached the same conclusion about Hill’s credibility had the ALJ not inappropriately ‘played doctor,’ ignored possible explanations for Hill’s conservative treatment, and conflated a desire to work with the ability to do so. So the ALJ’s errors are not harmless,” Judge Anne Claire Williams wrote.

Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Posner wrote a concurring opinion in which he focused on “a persistent, serious and often ignored deficiency in opinions by the Administrative Law Judges of the Social Security Administration” in denying benefits.

He noted the issues regarding VE testimony concerning the number and types of jobs that an applicant deemed not to be totally disabled could perform.  It appears the VEs simply divide census data estimates on the number of jobs in a broad category that includes the narrow category of jobs that the applicant can perform, by the total number of narrow categories in the broad category.

“The assumption is thus that every narrow category has the same number of jobs as every other narrow category within the broad category – a preposterous assumption,” Posner wrote.

“In short, the vocational expert’s testimony was worthless – and this apart from the apparent arbitrariness of his numerology,” he continued. “It is time the Social Security Disability Office cleaned up its act.”

The case is Anne R. Hill v. Carolyn W. Colvin, acting commissioner of Social Security, 15-1230.
(By Jennifer Nelson)
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Posner in his concurring opinion made the point that he has noticed “a persistent, serious and often ignored deficiency in opinions by the Administrative Law Judges of the Social Security Administration” in denying benefits. 
He stated that as fact. He did not offer or solicit any possible explanation for that fact. I submit that there is a probable easily explained reason for that fact. It is systemic. It could be remedied but at considerable expense. The SSA could hire only lawyers from the best law schools and pay them three times what the para-legal writers are receiving today. If only lawyers were writing SSA disability affirmations and the case load were reduced to a reasonable level, there would be a noticeable improvement in the quality of the denial decisions.
The hard truth is that SSA ALJs do not write their own decisions. They hold hearings and decide whether to pay or not to pay the claim. The decision is written by a staff writer who may not be a lawyer. The writers are often simply para-legal low level Government wage grade employees. Many para-legals have only completed a six month course at a junior college and received a para-legal certificate. Then through nepotism, favoritism, or affirmative action and luck they may find themselves at a Federal Agency writing Federal Court Decisions.
These writers do not have law degrees, but they are familiar with the SSA Regulations that pertain to disability evaluation. They simply choose which of the standard paragraphs in the SSA computer responds to each of the claimant’s allegations of symptoms and puts them into the decision. All of the parts of the decision are already written and are stored in the SSA computer.

SSA Must Follow Its Own Regulations

 

7th Circuit orders disability case back to administrative law judge


Because the Social Security Administration (SSA) Appeals Council (AC) did not consider new evidence when it was presented – despite its own regulations requiring it to do so – the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals sent a disability insurance benefits case back to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for further proceedings.

At the time of the hearing on Angela Farrell’s application for disability benefits, she was married with two children and extremely overweight. She suffered from multiple issues, including anxiety, insomnia, fibromyalgia, and plantar fasciitis. Her initial application was denied, but the Appeals Council remanded her case for reconsideration. On remand, the ALJ again ruled against her, in part because of Farrell’s failure to establish definitively that she suffered from fibromyalgia.

This time, the AC affirmed the ALJ’s decision, despite new evidence before the AC that confirmed Farrell’s fibromyalgia. The District Court also affirmed.

In addition to finding the Appeals Council didn’t follow its own regulations that require it to consider “new and material evidence,” the 7th Circuit found several other aspects of the ALJ’s decision independently require correction, including that the ALJ “failed to grapple properly with the competing medical opinions” in considering Farrell’s application.

Her Treating Physician (TP), Dr. Sarah Beyer, recorded Farrell suffered from several conditions and alluded to the possibility of Farrell suffering from fibromyalgia.
The other Consultative Examining (CE) Physicians who reviewed Farrell’s file as part of the application evaluation process believe that Farrell only had “moderate difficulties” or “mild restrictions on Average Daily Activity Level (ADL).” One doctor testified there was no evidence of a confirmed diagnosis of fibromyalgia or anything that would give rise to arthritic pain.

The 7th Circuit concluded in Angela M. Farrell v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, 11-3589,  that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination for Farrell improperly discounted the Treating Physician, Dr. Beyer’s medical opinions and that the RFC determination was based on an incomplete assessment of the record.

The judges sent the case back to the ALJ for further proceedings. REMANDED back to SSA ALJ.

This is the Case of  Angela M. Farrell v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, 11-3589.

SSA Claimant Cannot Work If There Are No Jobs

 

The Commissioner  the Social Security Administration (SSA) has established a five step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled.
1.       First, it is determined whether the person is engaging in substantial gainful employment (SGA). Is he/she working? If so disability benefits are denied.

2.       Second, if the person is not so engaged, it is determined whether the person has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. If the person does not have a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, benefits are denied.

3.       Third, if the person has a severe impairment, it is determined whether the impairment meets or equals one of a number of "listed impairments". If the impairment meets or equals a "Listed Impairment", the person is conclusively presumed to be disabled.

4.       Fourth, if the impairment does not meet or equal a "Listed Impairment", it is determined whether the impairment prevents the person from performing Past Relevant Work (PRW). If the person can perform PRW, benefits are denied.

5.       Fifth, if the person cannot perform PRW, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner of Social Security to show/prove that the person is able to perform any other kind of work.

The person is entitled to disability benefits only if he is unable to perform other work. (20 CFR Sec. 404.1520; Bowens v. Yuckert, 482 US 137, 140-142 (1987).


Step 4 explores a person's ability to perform work you have done in the past 15 years, despite their physical or mental impairments. 

 It does not matter at Step 4 if the claimant's former employer would not hire them, or if the place where the person worked is no longer in business, or if all those jobs are now done in China.

 If the Social Security Administration finds that the claimant can still perform his past relevant work, benefits are denied. The process proceeds to the 5th and final step.

Step 5 determines what other work, if any, a person can perform.

The claimant has the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence at Steps 1 through 4. 
At Step 5 the Burden of Proof shifts to the Commissioner of Social Security to prove that there is other work that the claimant can do despite mental and physical limitations.

The Social Security Administration considers the claimant's age, education, work experience and physical/mental condition to make this determination.
The  ALJ can use Medical-Vocational guidelines or “grids,” found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, at the fifth step of the disability determination after the claimant has been found not to meet the requirements of a listed impairment, but found nevertheless incapable of performing past relevant work.

The ALJ will determine what the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) is. That means, considering all of his/her limitations what is the claimant still capable of doing in the workplace? What is the heaviest weight he/she can lift? How long can he/she stand without a break? How long can he/she sit without a break? What level of manual dexterity is he/she capable of?


VOCATIONAL EXPERTS (VE)
A Vocational Expert witness (VE) may be called to testify to determine his/her vocational profile and whether their skills are transferrable based on the Medical-Vocational Grid (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). The VE will classify the claimant's past relevant work according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The VE will also give an opinion concerning whether there are there a significant number of jobs available in the local or national economy that he/she could apply for? A claimant cannot work if there are no jobs or a significant number of jobs available.

Vocational expert means a vocational professional who has the qualifications required by the Commissioner of SSA. The VE provides expertise to the ALJ at the hearing.

Consider this recent case where the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected denial of disabled woman’s benefits.

Finding repeated fault with the Social Security Administration (SSA) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who denied a Chandler woman Social Security disability payments, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the SSA.

Heather Browning claimed she was intellectually and physically disabled. She has an IQ of 68 and suffers from a disease that limits the movement of her left leg.

The 7th Circuit faulted the ALJ for concluding Browning’s IQ score was invalid and that she actually had higher mental faculties because she was assessed as being sarcastic.

“The administrative law judge thought the fact that the plaintiff goes to ‘bars and clubs,’ does some cooking and shopping, helps care for a pet, watches television, and ‘only takes over-the-counter pain medications,’ showed that she can do at least sedentary work,” Judge Richard Posner wrote in Heather Browning v. Carolyn W. Colvin, 13-3836.

“He suggested (probably on the basis of her not using prescription painkillers) that she had outgrown the effects of the Legg-Calve-Perthes disease that she had had as a child and that her current problems with her left leg were the result of her obesity. (But so what? The issue is the disabling effect of those problems.)”

The appellate court asserted the administrative law judge committed an error by instructing the Vocation Expert (VE) to assume Browning could perform sedentary work.

 Pointing to O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010), Judge Posner wrote the VE could not determine Browning’s ability to work because the judge would not let her consider several of the claimant’s limitations.

Also, the 7th Circuit questioned how many jobs would be available in Chandler for Browning and noted the judge’s conclusion that Browning could work as a “hand packer” is not a job that exists in the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

This was the Case of Heather Browning v. Carolyn W. Colvin, 13-3836.
(By Marilyn Odendahl)